^ ابEgypt during the Sadat years, By Kirk J. Beattie, p.4
^Dr. Assem Al-Desoky's Major Landowners in Egypt: 1914-1952 (in Arabic, Dar Al-Shorouk, Cairo, 2007. quoted in Egypt on the Brink by Tarek Osman, Yale University Press, 2010, p.45
^ ابجEgypt on the Brink by Tarek Osman, Yale University Press, 2010, p.48
^Egypt on the Brink by Tarek Osman, Yale University Press, 2010, p.47
^Egypt on the Brink by Tarek Osman, Yale University Press, 2010, p.49
^ ابEgypt on the Brink by Tarek Osman, Yale University Press, 2010, p.50
^Ferris، Jesse (2013). Nasser's Gamble: How Intervention in Yemen Caused the Six-Day War and the Decline of Egyptian Power. . Princeton: Princeton UP. ص. 9.
^Blackwell، Stephan (2009). British Military Intervention and the Struggle for Jordan: King Hussein, Nasser and the Middle East Crisis, 1955-1958. New York: Routledge. ص. 24–25.
^Elie Podeh؛ Onn Winckler (1 ديسمبر 2004). Rethinking Nasserism: Revolution and Historical Memory in Modern Egypt. University Press of Florida. ص. 105, 106. ISBN:978-0-8130-3137-8. the prominent historian and commentator Abd al-Azim Ramadan, In a series of articles published in AlWafd, subsequently compiled in a hook published in 2000, Ramadan criticized the Nasser cult, …. The events leading up to the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, as other events during Nasser's rule, Ramadan wrote, showed Nasser to be far from a rational, responsible leader. … His decision to nationalize the Suez Canal was his alone, made without political or military consultation. … The source of all this evil. Ramadan noted, was Nasser's inclination to solitary decision making… the revolutionary regime led by the same individual—Nasser— repeated its mistakes when it decided to expel the international peacekeeping force from the Sinai Peninsula and close the Straits of Tiran in 1967. Both decisions led to a state of war with Israel, despite the lack of military preparedness
^ ابجEgypt on the Brink by Tarek Osman, Yale University Press, 2010, p.120
