قيد الانتهاك

في حوكمة الشركات، يكون تقييد الانتهاك هو الحد الأقصى لرواتب المسؤولين التنفيذيين.^[1]^[2]^[3]^[4]

المراجع

^ Krugman، Paul (23 أغسطس 2002). "The Outrage Constraint". نيويورك تايمز. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2018-01-28. اطلع عليه بتاريخ 2011-10-22. In practice, modern C.E.O.'s set their own compensation, limited only by the outrage constraint -- outrage not on the part of the board, whose members depend on the C.E.O.'s good will for many of their perks, but on the part of outside groups that can make trouble.
^ Lucian Arye Bebchuk؛ Jesse M. Fried (1 سبتمبر 2006) [Previous edition 2004]. Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation. Harvard University Press. ص. 65. ISBN:978-0-674-02228-7. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2020-04-08. اطلع عليه بتاريخ 2011-10-25. When the potential outrage costs are large enough, they will deter the adoption of arrangements that managers would otherwise favor. We shall refer to arrangements that are deterred in this way as ones that violate the 'outrage constraint.'
^ Sheehan، Kym (18 مارس 2007). "Is the Outrage Constraint an Effective Constraint on Executive Remuneration? Evidence from the UK and Preliminary Results from Australia". Social Science Research Network. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2018-06-04. اطلع عليه بتاريخ 2011-10-23. The managerial power thesis of Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried argues that outrage is perhaps the only effective constraint on executive remuneration, where the board of directors is effectively dominated by a sufficiently powerful CEO or senior management group. {{استشهاد بدورية محكمة}}: الاستشهاد بدورية محكمة يطلب |دورية محكمة= (مساعدة)
^ Gordon, R. (7 September 2007). "Unresolved Issues in the Rise of American Inequality" (PDF). Presented at Brookings Panel on Economic Activity, Washington D.C. Department of Economics, Northwestern University. مؤرشف من الأصل (PDF) في 3 مايو 2012. اطلع عليه بتاريخ أغسطس 2020. Bebchuk and Fried (2004) provide a substantial amount of evidence that the principal‐agent setting cannot explain the salient facts about CEO pay. They propose an alternative model in which CEOs have control over boards of directors and are mainly restricted by an "outrage constraint" where shareholders retaliate if they perceive executive compensation to be excessive. {{استشهاد بمنشورات مؤتمر}}: تحقق من التاريخ في: |تاريخ الوصول= (مساعدة) والوسيط author-name-list parameters تكرر أكثر من مرة (مساعدة)

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[Krugman2002-1] Krugman، Paul (23 أغسطس 2002). "The Outrage Constraint". نيويورك تايمز. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2018-01-28. اطلع عليه بتاريخ 2011-10-22. In practice, modern C.E.O.'s set their own compensation, limited only by the outrage constraint -- outrage not on the part of the board, whose members depend on the C.E.O.'s good will for many of their perks, but on the part of outside groups that can make trouble.

[BebchukFried2006-2] Lucian Arye Bebchuk؛ Jesse M. Fried (1 سبتمبر 2006) [Previous edition 2004]. Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation. Harvard University Press. ص. 65. ISBN:978-0-674-02228-7. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2020-04-08. اطلع عليه بتاريخ 2011-10-25. When the potential outrage costs are large enough, they will deter the adoption of arrangements that managers would otherwise favor. We shall refer to arrangements that are deterred in this way as ones that violate the 'outrage constraint.'

[3] Sheehan، Kym (18 مارس 2007). "Is the Outrage Constraint an Effective Constraint on Executive Remuneration? Evidence from the UK and Preliminary Results from Australia". Social Science Research Network. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2018-06-04. اطلع عليه بتاريخ 2011-10-23. The managerial power thesis of Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried argues that outrage is perhaps the only effective constraint on executive remuneration, where the board of directors is effectively dominated by a sufficiently powerful CEO or senior management group. {{استشهاد بدورية محكمة}}: الاستشهاد بدورية محكمة يطلب |دورية محكمة= (مساعدة)

[4] Gordon, R. (7 September 2007). "Unresolved Issues in the Rise of American Inequality" (PDF). Presented at Brookings Panel on Economic Activity, Washington D.C. Department of Economics, Northwestern University. مؤرشف من الأصل (PDF) في 3 مايو 2012. اطلع عليه بتاريخ أغسطس 2020. Bebchuk and Fried (2004) provide a substantial amount of evidence that the principal‐agent setting cannot explain the salient facts about CEO pay. They propose an alternative model in which CEOs have control over boards of directors and are mainly restricted by an "outrage constraint" where shareholders retaliate if they perceive executive compensation to be excessive. {{استشهاد بمنشورات مؤتمر}}: تحقق من التاريخ في: |تاريخ الوصول= (مساعدة) والوسيط author-name-list parameters تكرر أكثر من مرة (مساعدة)

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